Washington (February 12, 2025) – Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Representative Don Beyer (VA-08), Senate and House members of the congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, wrote to Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright regarding their concerns that Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has been granted access to DOE, which oversees the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the nation’s most sensitive nuclear weapons secrets. 

In the letter the lawmakers wrote, “According to media reports, a 23-year-old former SpaceX intern, who does not have the appropriate security clearances needed to access DOE’s IT system, received access over the objections of members of its general counsel and chief information officers. This incursion into some of the nation’s most sensitive files is the latest in a series of Trump administration moves to plant unqualified Musk and DOGE staffers throughout the federal government, some of whom have records of leaking sensitive information and potentially wreaking havoc with vital information systems.” 

The lawmakers continued, “We are deeply concerned by this disregard of DOE security protocols and the potential impacts on our nuclear security.” 

The lawmakers request that the DOE answer the following questions by February 14, 2025: 

1.      What is the process for granting, reviewing, and revoking security clearances for DOGE staffers at DOE? 

2.      Have any DOGE staffers been given access to NNSA classified nuclear weapons information, specifically Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, or Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information? If so, please provide the names of DOGE staffers, their security clearance levels, the dates their clearances were granted, and the programs or types of data these staffers accessed. 

3.      Under what authority and justification was each instance of classified access granted to DOGE staffers?  

4.      Are DOGE staffers required to undergo training on the handling of classified information? 

5.      What security measures are in place to ensure DOGE staffers do not improperly access or inappropriately share sensitive nuclear secrets? 

6.      Have any DOGE staffers with access to classified information had significant outside financial interests, foreign contacts, or other affiliations that could pose security concerns? 

7.      Are NNSA employees included in the Administration’s buy-out offer for federal employees? If so, and if senior NNSA employees leave the organization, how do you plan to maintain security and secrecy of nuclear weapons and related information?