The drafters of the U. S. Constitution recognized that the power of the president should be subject to restrictions. A president is not a king or a dictator, regardless of how some presidents view their executive authority. History is rife with examples of executive excess and Congressional oversight that imposed, or tried to impose, checks and balances on the Executive Branch. One such example is the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was passed by Congress 60 years ago next week, and signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on August 10, 1964. Although the Joint Resolution was intended to “promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia,” the Resolution was used by Johnson to enter into a war against North Vietnam without the required congressional declaration of war.

Although it appeared to the public at-large that the Resolution was quickly drafted after reports of attacks on U.S. ships in early August, language for a draft resolution had been circulating among State Department, Defense Department, and White House staff for several months. Attempts by Johnson to introduce a resolution earlier in 1964 were rebuffed by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and others, who felt that it was too early to move forward. Johnson, though, wanted to demonstrate that he was not “soft on Communism” in the upcoming presidential election, and to send American troops into Southeast Asia. At that time. American military personnel sent there were termed “observers,” regardless of the dangers already present in the conflict between North and South Vietnam.

“Incidents” on August 2 and 4 were reported as North Vietnamese attacks on the American ships Maddox and Turner Joy, and Johnson accelerated the effort to introduce the resolution in the House and Senate. Later military and government investigations determined that an enemy attack, as described, could not be proven, but the resolution was already on its way to Capitol Hill. Despite several Senators’ reluctance to vote for the resolution, it passed the Senate on August 7 with only two “nay” votes from Senators Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) and Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska). Morse often noted that, in the Senate cloakroom, many Senators expressed concern about the resolution and agreed with him but cast their “yea” votes on the floor. Some insisted that the resolution did not give Johnson authority to send American troops to war, but Johnson differed, and used the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to send tens of thousands of American troops into Vietnam.

Morse never wavered in his contention that American entry into the war was illegal and became a hero to anti-war protesters at home and abroad. During Senate hearings about Vietnam in 1966 and 1967, Morse sternly queried Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who stonewalled or wavered from the truth. Anti-war visitors to Morse’s office were peaceful but often clogged the elegant hallways of the Russell Senate Office Building, waiting to sign the office guestbook, sometimes kissing the book and leaving lipstick imprints! In February 1966, Morse introduced a bill to repeal the resolution but only got five votes in support. In 1971, three years after Morse was defeated for a fifth Senate term, the resolution was repealed. President Nixon vetoed the repeal bill but was soundly overridden by both the Senate and the House.

The War Powers Act of 1973 further defined and restricted the authorities and responsibilities of the Executive and Legislative Branches regarding declarations of war and imposed strict time limits for actions on both branches. Historians and legal scholars have debated the efficacy of the Act for decades, and some presidents have skirted the law in subsequent “military actions” around the globe. With barely 100 days until this year’s presidential election, it would be wise to consider how presidential power might be used, or misused, by the candidates on the November ballot.